8th December Bombing Raid of Allied Singapore

The bombing raid was conducted in 8th December 1941, this was the first signal to Singapore that war had already broken out on the far east.


The attack on Singapore was assigned to 34 bombers of Genzan Air Group (Genzan Kaigun Kōkūtai) and 31 bombers of Mihoro Air Group. Their targets were RAF Tengah, RAF Seletar, Sembawang Naval Base and Keppel Harbour (If you know the Call of Duty: Black Ops 2 multiplayer map, that's just the futuristic version of the real harbor.)

The Call Of Duty: Black Ops II Keppel Terminal Map (above), The real Keppel Terminal (below)

Tengah Air Base (IATA: TGA, ICAO: WSAT) is a military airbase of the Republic of Singapore Air Force located at Tengah, in the western part of Singapore. The airbase is the most important airfield of the RSAF as it houses the bulk of RSAF's fixed-wing frontline squadrons, home to all of RSAF's Airborne early warning and control (AEWC) assets, most of the F-16C/D Fighting Falcons and a large number of UAVs. The air base goes by the motto of "Always Vigilant", which is supported by its main motif, a chess board Black Knight piece symbolic of the aircraft’s operational readiness in Tengah. The sword represents war’s heraldic sword of destruction, while the state is depicted by the castle.

Prior to Singapore's independence, it was a flying Royal Air Force station known as RAF Tengah.

A BQ (bad quality) map of Tengah Air Base)


Seletar Airport (IATA: XSP, ICAO: WSSL) is a civilian airport located at Seletar, in the northeastern region of Singapore, and is managed by the Changi Airport Group. Originally, the airport was completed in 1928 as a flying Royal Air Force station (RAF Seletar) and was also Singapore's first international airport.

The Singapore Naval Base (as Her/His Majesty's Naval Base (HMNB) Singapore or HMS Sembawang), situated in Sembawang at the northern tip of Singapore, was a Royal Navy Shore establishment as well as being a cornerstone of British Defence policy (the Singapore strategy) in the Far East between the World Wars.

Six squadrons from both air groups took off from southern Indochina on the night of 7 December 1941. However, bad weather conditions were encountered while over the South China Sea. Thick clouds offered poor visibility for the pilots, while rough winds caused most of the formations to become separated. After several attempts to regroup failed, Lieutenant Commander Niichi Nakanishi, Wing Commander of Genzan Air Group, ordered them to abort mission and return to base, thereby reducing the impact of a much heavier raid. Only seventeen G3M bombers of Mihoro Air Group reached Singapore on schedule, unobstructed by bad weather.

The Attack

The Japanese formation was detected by a radar station in Mersing, Malaya, almost an hour before they reached Singapore. Three Brewster Buffalo fighters of No. 453 Squadron RAAF were on standby at RAF Sembawang. However, Flight Lieutenant Tim Vigors' request to scramble and intercept the Japanese bombers was denied. Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham feared that the anti-aircraft batteries would fire on the friendly fighters, despite Vigors being an experienced night fighter in the Battle of Britain. He was supplemented by the belief that the Buffalo fighter was only suited for daylight fighting and could not be used at night. Paradoxically, there were 12 Bristol Blenheim Mark IF night fighters of No. 27 Squadron RAF stationed in Sungai Petani, Malaya, but were being used as ground-attack aircraft.

The streets were still brightly lit despite air raid sirens going off at 0400, allowing pilot navigators to locate their targets without difficulty. ARP Headquarters was not even manned, and there was no blackout as police and power station officials could not find the employee who had the key to the switch (only two practice blackouts were conducted in September 1941 before the raid). When the bombers began their attack at 0430, Allied anti-aircraft guns immediately opened fire. The battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse also responded, but no aircraft was shot down. A formation of nine bombers flew over without releasing their bombs to draw the searchlights and anti-aircraft guns away from the other group. They were flying at 12,000 feet, while the second formation was at 4,000 feet.

Aftermath

The 'Raiders Passed' signal was sent out at 0500. The bombers succeeded in bombing the airfields at Seletar and Tengah, damaging three Bristol Blenheim bombers of No. 34 Squadron RAF. A number of bombs also fell on Raffles Place. 61 people were killed and more than 700 were injured. Most of the casualties were troops of the 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles, 11th Indian Infantry Division. The Japanese bombers all returned safely to Thu Dau Mot.


Though the bombing caused only minor damage to the airfields, it stunned the British Far East Command. Despite intelligence reports of Japanese aircraft performance in the Second Sino-Japanese War, the command did not believe Japan's air forces were capable of striking Singapore from airfields more than 600 miles away in Indochina. The raid came as a surprise to Lieutenant General Arthur Percival, who "hardly expected the Japanese to have any very long-range aircraft."

"Rudely awakened in the small hours of the morning by the screams of air raid sirens and the roar of ack ack guns and in the clear moonlit sky around a formation of Japanese bombers. Bombs were dropped but none fell in our area. So the war in the Far East started - all day we heard news bulletins telling of the wide spread treachery of the Japs - Well! They've asked for it - !!"
— Diary and 'Line' book written by the pilots of No. 453 Squadron RAAF

In the days that followed, Singapore enjoyed a considerable respite from air raids, as the Japanese focussed their attacks on key aerodromes and Allied positions in northern Malaya. The next raid on the island occurred on the night of 16/17 December 1941, which in itself was merely a minor attack on RAF Tengah by two Japanese Ki-21s. Only on the night of 29/30 December did nightly raids resume in earnest on Singapore City. In contrast, daylight raids commenced much later, on 12 January 1942, following the fall of Kuala Lumpur to the Japanese the previous day and the shifting of the bulk of the IJAAF to southern Malaya.

After the bombing, I guess that Singaporeans have learnt to be alert at all times, which then relates to the five defenses in Total Defense (Military Defense, Civil Defense, Economical Defense, Social Defense & Psychological Defense). Before, Singaporeans had to rely on the British for news updates. After independence, Singapore listened to the world to what is going on. I also think that Singapore has learnt to be self-reliant, as others might not see other threats coming.

Website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Singapore_(1941)
Date accessed: 11th February 2013